Abstract. An infinite two-player zero-sum game with a Borel winning set, in which the opponent's actions are monitored eventually but not necessarily immediately after they are played, admits a value. The proof relies on a representation of the game as a stochastic game with perfect information, in which Nature operates as a delegate for the players and performs the randomizations for them.
Setup
Consider an infinite two-player zero-sum game that is given by a triple A, (P n ) n∈N , W where A is a finite set of actions, P n is a partition of A n for every n ∈ N, and W ⊆ A N is a Borel set, the winning set of player 1. The game is played in stages: Player 1 chooses an action a 0 ∈ A; then player 2 chooses an action a 1 ∈ A; then player 1 chooses an action a 2 ∈ A, and so on, ad infinitum. Before choosing a n , the player who plays at stage n receives some information about his opponent's actions at previous stages: Let h = (a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a n−1 ) be the finite history that consists of the actions played before stage n; then before choosing a n , the player who plays at stage n observes the atom of P n that contains h. Player 1 wins the game if the infinite history (a 0 , a 1 , . . . ) is in W . When the action set and information partitions are fixed, I denote the game by Γ(W ).
A behavioral strategy x = (x n ) n∈N of player 1 is a sequence {x n :
P n → ∆(A)} n=0,2,4,... of functions: At stage n, after observing the finite history h = (a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a n−1 ), player 1 randomizes his action according to x n (π n (h)), where π n (h) is the atom of P n that contains h. Abusing notations, I sometimes write x n (h) instead of x n (π n (h)). Behavioral strategies y of player 2 are defined analogously.
Every pair x, y of strategies induces a probability distribution µ x,y over the set A N of infinite histories or plays: µ x,y is the joint distribution of a sequence α 0 , α 1 , . . . . . . of A-valued random variables such that a strategy x of player 1 is ǫ-optimal if µ x,y (W ) ≥ val Γ(W ) − ǫ for every strategy y of player 2. We also say that player 1 can guarantee payoff of at least val Γ(W ) − ǫ by playing such a strategy x. ǫ-optimal strategies of player 2 are defined analogously.
Let ∼ n be the equivalence relation over infinite histories such that u ∼ n u ′ whenever u| n and u ′ | n belong to the same atom of P n , where u| n and u ′ | n are the initial segments of u and u ′ of length n. The interpretation is that if u, u ′ ∈ A N and u ∼ n u ′ , then at stage n the player cannot distinguish between u and u ′ . Say that at stage n the player observes the action of stage m if, for every pair of infinite histories
1.1. Definition. The information partitions (P n ) n≥0 satisfy perfect recall if the following conditions are satisfied:
(1) Players know their own actions: at stage n the player observes the action of stage n − 2.
(2) Players do not forget information:
The setup of infinite games with perfect recall is general enough to subsume two special cases which have been extensively studied:
Borel games. If, at every stage n, players observe previous actions of their opponents, then the game is called a Borel game or a game with perfect information. Gale and Stewart [3] proved that such games are determined if the winning set W is closed. In a seminal paper, Martin [7] proved that the game is determined for every Borel winning set W . Borel games admit pure 0-optimal strategies, and the value is 0 or 1. Moreover, Borel games with an infinite action set A are also determined.
Blackwell games. Assume that at even stages n = 2k, player 1 observes the actions of stages 0, 1, . . . , 2k − 1, and at odd stages n = 2k + 1, player 2 observes the actions of stages 0, 1, . . . , 2k − 1 (his own actions and all the previous actions of his opponent except for the last one), and that the information partitions are the roughest partitions that satisfy these conditions. This means essentially that the players play simultaneously at stages 2k and 2k + 1 for every k ∈ N, and then both actions are announced. Such games are called Blackwell games. Blackwell [1, 2] proved the determinacy of Blackwell games (which he called "infinite games with imperfect information") with a G δ winning set, and conjectured that every Blackwell game with a Borel winning set is determined. Vervoort [11] advanced higher in the Borel hierarchy, proving determinacy of games with G δσ winning sets.
Blackwell's conjecture was proved by Martin in 1998 [8] . an even n such that u ≁ n u ′ and an odd n such that u ≁ n u ′ .
The purpose of this paper is to prove the following theorem. 
Games with a compact winning set
The set A N of plays is naturally endowed with the product topology.
In this section I prove the special case of Theorem 1.3 for compact winning sets. The determinacy follows from perfect recall alone, even without eventual perfect monitoring. The proof relies on two standard results from game theory: the Minimax Theorem for normal form games and Kuhn's Theorem.
Recall that a normal form game is given by a triple (Σ, Θ, R) where Σ and Θ are Borel spaces of pure strategies for players 1 and 2, and
A mixed strategy ξ of player 1 is a probability distribution over Σ. Mixed strategies τ of player 2
are defined analogously. Say that the mixed extension of the normal
The Minimax Theorem [10, Proposition A.10] states that if Σ is a compact topological space and the function R(·, θ) is upper semicontinuous for every θ ∈ Θ, then the mixed extension of the normal form game (Σ, Θ, R) is determined.
Let Γ = (A, {P n } n∈N , W ) be an infinite game with perfect recall.
The normal form of Γ is the normal form game N(Γ) = (Σ, Θ, R) defined as follows. A pure strategy σ ∈ Σ of player 1 is a sequence {σ n : P n → A} n even of functions: at stage n, after the finite history h = (h 0 , h 1 , . . . , h n−1 ) was played, player 1 plays σ n (π n (h)), where π n (h) is the atom of P n that contains h. Pure strategies θ of player 2 are defined analogously. Every pair σ, θ of pure strategies of players 1 and 2 determines an infinite history u(σ, θ) = (a 0 , a 1 , . . . ) that is given by
. . , a n−1 )) , for even n, θ n (π n (a 0 , . . . , a n−1 )) , for odd n. show that the fact that in Γ * the player announces his randomization plan cannot be used by the opponent to change the payoff in the game.
This step, which is the core of the proof, uses approximations of the winning set by compact sets, and the fact that by Lemma 3.1 the original game Γ is determined when the winning set is compact.
Since the sets of actions must be finite for Martin's Theorem to apply, I first prove that every behavioral strategy in Γ can be approximated by a behavioral strategy in which all the mixtures are taken from some finite sets. This is done in Lemma 4.2. Because of the approximation argument, the stochastic game Γ * that is constructed in the proof depends on an additional parameter ǫ which corresponds to the level of approximation.
Preliminaries. Let A <N = n∈N A n be the set of finite histories of the game. For a finite history h ∈ A n , the length of h is given by length(h) = n. For an infinite history u = (a 0 , a 1 , a 2 , . . . ) ∈ A N and n ∈ N, let u| n = (a 0 , . . . , a n−1 ) ∈ A <N be the initial segment of u of length n. Similarly, for a finite history h ∈ A <N and n < length(h), let h| n be the initial segment of h of length n. 
Proof. This is an application of König's Lemma. Assume without loss of generality that m is odd. Let a ∈ A, and let C a = {u = (u 0 , u 1 , . . . 
even n, in contradiction to the eventual perfect monitoring assumption.
By König's Lemma, T a is finite. Let n a be the maximal length of elements of T a , and let n = max{n a |a ∈ A} + 2. Then at stage n player 1 observes the action of stage m.
For two strategies x, x ′ of player 1, let d(x, x ′ ), the distance between
x and x ′ , be given by
where the maximum is taken over all atoms p of P n . The distance d(y, y ′ ) between two behavioral strategies y, y ′ of player 2 is defined analogously.
Lemma. Let x, x
′ be strategies of player 1 and y, y ′ be strategies of player 2. Then
Proof. The idea is to join a (x, y)-random play and a (x ′ , y ′ )-random play such that the two random plays are equal with high probability.
Let z n : P n → A be given by z n = x n for even n's and z n = y n for odd n's and z 
for every n and every a 0 , a ′ 0 , . . . , a n−1 , a ′ n−1 ∈ A. The existence of random variables α n , α ′ n with the prescribed conditional distribution follows from a standard coupling argument [4, Theorem 5.2] . From (3) it follows that P (α n = a |α i = a i for 0 ≤ i < n) = z n (a 0 , . . . , a n−1 ) [a] for every n and every a 0 , . . . , a n−1 ∈ A, i.e., that α 0 , α 1 , . . . is an (x, y)-random play of Γ(W ). Similarly, from (4) it follows that α
Therefore,
The assertion follows from the last inequality and the fact that µ x,y and Proof. Let y ′ be an ǫ/2-optimal strategy of player 2 in Γ(W ) and let y be a strategy of player 2 such that y n (p) − y ′ n (p) 1 < ǫ/2 n and y n (p) ∈ ∆ ǫ,n (A) for every odd n and every atom p of P n . Then d(y, y ′ ) < ǫ, and therefore,
for every strategy x of player 1, where the first inequality follows from Lemma 4.2, and the second inequality from the fact that y ′ is ǫ/2-optimal. Therefore y is ǫ-optimal.
Nature as the players' randomization delegate. Let Γ = (A, P n , W )
be an infinite game with perfect recall and eventual perfect monitoring.
In this section, I define an auxiliary stochastic game Γ * ǫ = Γ * ǫ (W ) with perfect information, which mimics the original games Γ. For every n, let B n = {b : P n → ∆ ǫ,n } be the set of actions of stage n in Γ * ǫ (W ), so that an action is a function from P n (viewed as a collection of atoms) to ∆ ǫ,n ; and let S n = A Kn be the set of states
be the projection over the corresponding coordinates m ∈ K n , and let
is played as follows: Player 1 plays at even stages and player 2 at odd stages. At every stage n, Nature announces a state s n in S n , and then the player that play at that stage announces an action b n in B n . Nature chooses the state s n of stage n from the distribution z (s 0 , b 0 , . . . , s n−1 , b n−1 ) that is given by
whereᾱ 0 , . . . ,ᾱ n is a sequence of A-valued random variables such that
where π k (h) is the atom of P k that contains h for every h ∈ A k . Player
A pure strategy of player 1 in Γ * 
. . , ζ n−1 , β n−1 , ζ n ) for even n, and β n = y * n (ζ 0 , β 0 , . . . , ζ n−1 , β n−1 , ζ n ) for odd n.
I call such a sequence ζ 0 , β 0 , ζ 1 , β 1 , . . . of random variables an (x * , y * )-random play of Γ * ǫ (W ). Identifying the game Γ * ǫ (W ) with its normal form, say that Γ *
In this case the common value of the two sides of the last equations is called the value of the game, and is denoted by val Γ * ǫ (W ).
Proof. In the terminology of appendix A, the game Γ * ǫ (W ) is the stochastic game with stochastic setup S = ((S n , B n ) n∈N , z) and the winning set η −1 (W ), where η :
Thus η −1 (W ) is a Borel set and therefore by Proposition A.1 the game
The assertion follows from the fact that the games (S, η −1 (W 0 )) and (S, η −1 (W )) are Γ * ǫ (W 0 ) and Γ * ǫ (W ), respectively.
The following lemma says that, up to ǫ, player 2 can guarantee in Γ * ǫ the same amount he can guarentee in Γ. Intuitively, when player 2 computes the upper value of the game, he assumes that player 1 is going to play the best response to player 2's strategy; so the fact that in Γ * ǫ (W ) player 2 has to declare his contingent mixed action does not reduce the upper value of the game.
Lemma. For every Borel set
Proof. Note first that by definition of K n and from the perfect recall assumption, there exist functions g n,k : P n → S k for every n and every
for every h = (a 0 , . . . , a n−1 ) ∈ A n and where π n : A n → P n is the natural projection.
Let y be an ǫ-optimal behavioral strategy for player 2 in Γ(W ) such that y n (p) ∈ ∆ ǫ,n (A) for every odd n and every atom p of P n . The ex- 
β n = x * n (ζ 0 , β 0 , . . . , ζ n−1 , β n−1 , ζ n ) for even n, (13) β n = y * n (ζ 0 , β 0 , . . . , ζ n−1 , β n−1 , ζ n ) for odd n, and (14)
From (11) and (12) it follows that
for every n and every k ≤ n. From (14) and the definition of y * , it follows that β n = y n for every odd n. In particular,
for every odd n. From (13), the definition of x, the fact that β k = y k for every odd k, and (16), it follows that
for every even n. From (15), (17), (18), and (11), it follows that
i.e., that α 0 , α 1 , . . . is an (x, y)-random play of Γ(W ).
From (12), (13), (14), (15), and (7), it follows that
Indeed, given the event {ζ 0 = s 0 , β 0 = b 0 , . . . , ζ n−1 = s n−1 , β n−1 = b n−1 }, the conditional distribution of α 0 , . . . , α n is like the conditional distribution of a sequenceᾱ 0 , . . . ,ᾱ n that satisfies (8) given that f k (ᾱ 0 ) = s k for k < n. (Here I use the fact that β n is measurable with respect to ζ 0 , . . . , ζ n .)
From (19),(13), and (14) it follows that ζ 0 , β 0 , ζ 1 , β 1 , . . . is an (x * , y * )-random play of Γ ǫ (W ). Therefore, the expected payoff for player 1 in
where the first equality follows from (6) and (12), the second equality from (2) , and the inequality from the fact that y is ǫ-optimal. The following proposition was proved by Martin [8] . For the stochastic extension, see Maitra and Sudderth's paper [6] . The fact that the lower value of the game can be approximated by the value on some compact subset was proved earlier by Maitra et al. [5] , using Choquet's Capacity Theorem.
